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A B S T R A C T   
Performance standards have a long history in environmental policy. A performance standard sets a standard of 
technology performance but leaves technology choice to producers; it increases the relative costs of technologies 
with undesirable performance characteristics and lowers the costs of technologies with desirable characteristics. 
The primary motivations are to promote innovation, to address consumers’ undervaluation of efficiency, and to 
reduce externalities, such as air pollution and the risks of dependence on foreign oil. In the past decade, trading 
has been incorporated (thus termed as tradable performance standard, TPS) into several U.S. transportation 
programs: regulations for greenhouse gas emissions from passenger cars and trucks (national), zero-emission 
vehicle programs (10 states), the Renewable Fuel Standard (national), and low-carbon fuel standards (two 
states). TPS allows for equalization of marginal costs across eligible technologies and is therefore more efficient 
than pure regulations. We show that sectoral TPS programs have high credit prices but low price effects on 
products and provide strong incentives for upstream innovation and technology transformation. Unlike emissions 
pricing, however, they do not have a strong output effect: consumers do not bear the full cost of the pollution and 
do not have incentive to reduce consumption of polluting products. Given that the expected carbon price may be 
too low to substantially affect transportation demand or technology change, combining TPS with a carbon price 
may be necessary to drive innovation and achieve a sustained low-carbon transformation in the sector.   
1. Introduction 
Performance standards have a long history in the US transportation 
sector, beginning at the national level with the Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) standards enacted by Congress in 1975 (Greene, 
1990), and in California with the Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) program 
adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) in 1990 (Col-
lantes and Sperling, 2008). Unlike technology mandates, which pre-
scribe specific technology (e.g., a three-way catalytic converter), 
performance standards set a goal (e.g., maximum emissions per unit of 
performance, or vehicle efficiency of at least x miles per gallon), 
enabling the regulated entity to choose any technology mix that ach-
ieves that outcome (Bergek and Berggren, 2014). Performance standards 
can force technology innovation by specifying a standard that cannot be 
met with conventional technology (Lee et al., 2010) or that imposes 
higher cost (Gerard and Lave, 2005). When implemented as technology 
volume requirements (e.g., requiring that products with a specific 
technology constitute x percentage of all new sales), performance 
standards push an identified technology into the market, usually with 
the intent of achieving cost reductions through market penetration. 
When implemented as an emissions intensity standard, performance 
standards provide flexibility by enabling compliance through incre-
mental improvements without specifying technology choice. Tradability 
or averaging of performance across facilities introduces additional 
flexibility and thus improves the cost-effectiveness of the policy. 
TPS programs have been prominent in the US electricity sector, 
exemplified in 29 states’ renewable portfolio standards and in the 
Obama administration’s proposed Clean Power Plan. Recently, China 
announced its intent to implement the largest rate-based emissions 
trading program in the world in its electricity sector (Goulder and 
Morgenstern, 2018). Some incentive-based regulatory programs address 
the transportation sector. In the bonus-malus (Latin for good-bad, here 
meaning credit-tax) system in France, consumers receive a rebate for 
low-emission vehicles but pay a fee for higher-emission vehicles. The 
European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive mandates that clean 
sources account for minimum shares of the energy consumed in road and 
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rail transport in member countries. 
Few programs in the transportation sector, however, allow com-
panies to trade credits for compliance.1 The most prominent examples 
have been in the United States. The US lead phasedown in the 1980s 
employed a tradable performance standard that rapidly drove the lead 
content of gasoline to negligible levels (Kerr and Newell, 2003). Current 
examples include the national regulations for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from passenger cars and trucks (introduced in 2009, with first 
trading in 2012), zero-emission vehicle programs in 10 states (first 
adoption in 1990, first trading in 2012), the national Renewable Fuel 
Standard (introduced in 2005, first trading in 2010), and California’s 
Low Carbon Fuel Standards (adopted in 2010, first trading in 2011). 
Earlier attention to performance standards focused on their ability to 
promote innovation (Nentjes et al., 2007; Bergek and Berggren, 2014; 
Klier and Linn, 2016) and to address imperfect competition, consumers’ 
undervaluation of energy efficiency (Greene, 2019; Fischer, 2010), 
consumers’ inelasticity to fuel price changes (Hughes et al., 2008; Lin 
and Prince, 2013), and externalities such as air pollution and the risks of 
dependence on foreign sources of oil (Lin and Prince, 2009; Schnepf and 
Yacobucci, 2013). In the absence of federal leadership in implementing 
ambitious carbon pricing, attention has shifted to the cost-effectiveness 
of TPS compared with carbon pricing (Nentjes and Woerdman, 2012). It 
is often argued that without comprehensive, global carbon pricing, TPS 
programs must increasingly be part of emissions reduction policies if we 
are to control the total carbon concentration in the atmosphere (Sperling 
and Nichols, 2012). 
Broadly speaking, pollution can be abated either through changes in 
technology (inputs and production technologies) or through reduced 
consumption of the goods that embed emissions. Abatement of emis-
sions through changes in technology is the main objective of TPS pro-
grams. In contrast, a price on carbon emissions provides incentives to 
change both technology (input substitution and abatement effects) and 
consumption levels or technology (the output effect) (Goulder et al., 
1999). Emissions pricing puts an equal value on emissions reductions 
throughout the value chain; this generally means that it is the most 
efficient policy (Sterner, 2007). 
TPS programs are more common than carbon pricing in the US 
transportation sector, for several reasons. The sector has some of the 
highest GHG mitigation costs of developed countries’ economies 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2014; Creutzig 
et al., 2015; Yeh et al., 2017; Gillingham and Stock, 2018), and therefore 
either very high fuel taxes or separate policy instruments other than 
carbon pricing are needed to achieve GHG reduction goals. Even with 
high fuel taxes in Europe, for example, emissions reduction targets still 
face significant challenges. Fuel tax increases have provoked strong 
backlashes, such as the “yellow vests” movement in France. In contrast, 
both politically and economically, the production subsidy to desired 
technologies implicit in the TPS approach (explained below) drives 
technological change while reducing the visible costs to consumers, 
compared with achieving the same outcome with carbon pricing. 
Nonmarket-based policy instruments such as regulations, technology 
mandates, and standards focus directly on technology change, but they 
may result in substantial differences in marginal abatement costs even 
within the same industry. Tradable standards are more economically 
efficient because they allow for equalization of marginal costs across 
technologies and firms. But unlike emissions pricing, they do not have a 
strong output effect: consumers do not bear the full cost of the pollution 
and do not have incentive to reduce consumption of polluting products. 
Our paper begins by evaluating TPS programs, focusing on real- 
world implementation of two national programs and two state-level 
programs as they have been implemented in California (Section 2). 
We then compare carbon pricing to a TPS in the form of an intensity 
standard in terms of their price effects, return to investment in innova-
tion (Section 3), and mitigation costs at the program and system levels 
(Section 4). We look specifically at the policies’ effectiveness in reducing 
GHG emissions but do not address other important aspects, such as eq-
uity effects, that are reviewed elsewhere. In Section 5 we summarize the 
lessons learned and offer recommendations. 
2. Review of notable programs 
A performance standard can target performance (e.g., sales of elec-
tric vehicles, vehicle efficiency in miles per gallon) or emissions in-
tensity (e.g., carbon intensity of fuels, emissions intensity of vehicles). 
The requirements typically become more stringent over time, often 
leading to higher credit prices and incentives to innovate. Compliance 
requirements can be placed upstream (on producers or suppliers) or 
downstream (on consumers). Often, the point of regulation is placed as 
far upstream as possible to reduce the regulatory burden for adminis-
tration, reporting, and monitoring. Small producers below a specified 
threshold are frequently exempted. 
TPS compliance options typically include (1) producing products 
that meet or exceed the standard, thereby generating credits that can be 
sold to other producers; (2) purchasing surplus credits from other pro-
ducers; and (3) using banked credits or credits borrowed against future 
credits (if allowed). Monitoring, verification, and enforcement re-
quirements are similar to those in other environmental markets, with the 
noncompliance penalty becoming the de facto ceiling for the credit 
price. If there is a cap on credit prices that is lower than the marginal 
compliance cost, then the standard will not be met (Greenstone and 
Nath, 2019). One of the prime stated purposes is to foment technical 
progress. If this is achieved, then the rise in credit prices may be 
dampened or even reversed. 
In the four following sections we go through in turn a number of 
prominent programs, two for vehicles and two for fuels. Two in Cali-
fornia and two are federal US programs. Section 2.5 summarizes. 
2.1. Regulations for passenger vehicle GHG emissions 
The US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations for 
light-duty vehicles were enacted by Congress in 1975 and implemented 
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 
1978. The 1975 law established separate sales-weighted average miles 
per gallon standards for passenger cars and light trucks and required 
each manufacturer’s new-vehicle fleets to meet the relevant standard.2 
The standards for cars have required somewhat greater relative in-
creases than those for trucks (US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), 2020). Within their own regulated fleets, manufacturers could 
bank credits and borrow against future credits, but credit trading be-
tween manufacturers was not allowed. In 2007, Congress amended the 
law to allow credit trading. It also required that a manufacturer’s 
standard be indexed to the size of the vehicles it produced, as measured 
by their “footprints.”3 That year, the US Supreme Court ruled that GHGs 
were a pollutant as defined under the US Clean Air Act, a decision that 
affirmed the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
regulate motor vehicle GHG emissions. NHTSA, EPA, and the California 
Air Resources Board (CARB) jointly implemented coordinated fuel 1 Sweden, for example, has a program for increasing biofuel content of diesel 
and gasoline called Reduktionsplikten (reduction mandate). Each year the fuel 
producers must achieve a certain percentage of biofuel. These obligations are in 
some cases tradable, making this almost a TPS, although there has little dis-
cussion of this aspect. Similarly, the European mandatory CO2 emission targets 
for new passenger cars allow vehicle manufacturers to pool their sales to avoid 
penalties. 
2 The standard defines average as the harmonic mean of miles per gallon, 
which is equivalent to the mean of gallons per mile.  
3 A vehicle’s footprint is defined as the average of its front and rear axle track 
width multiplied by its wheelbase. 
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economy and GHG emissions standards for model years 2012 through 
2025.4 
When fuel economy or GHG standards are binding, they impose 
shadow prices on inefficient, higher-emitting vehicles in proportion to 
their deviation from the standard but subsidize fuel-efficient, low-GHG 
vehicles (Davis and Knittel, 2019). In the case of the footprint standard, 
the shadow pricing is relative to the target for a vehicle of a given type 
and size (Liu and Greene, 2014). Before trading between firms was 
allowed, shadow prices exhibited substantial heterogeneity across 
manufacturers because of differences in their market segments and their 
access to fuel-efficient technology (Jacobsen, 2013; Anderson and Sal-
lee, 2011). This heterogeneity should incentivize trading between firms. 
One analysis estimated that full trading across vehicle classes and be-
tween manufacturers could reduce the compliance costs of a 40% in-
crease in fuel economy from 2012 to 2020 by more than 10% (Rubin 
et al., 2009). A small reduction in the benefits of trading, however, 
might result from oligopoly and oligopsony in credit markets. Another 
reason the full potential of trading might not be realized is that manu-
facturers may choose to pay fines if the cost of meeting the standards 
exceeds the fine. 
Before footprint standards and credit trading, manufacturers of 
luxury imported vehicles, including Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Porsche, 
Volvo, Daimler Chrysler, and Jaguar Land Rover, accumulated more 
than $870 million in fines (nominal value) between 1983 and 2012 
(Fig. 1). Some companies—Fiat Chrysler, Jaguar Land Rover, and Vol-
vo—continued to pay fines after 2012, when trading became available, 
but the number of companies paying fines fell significantly. The fines 
translate to less than $100 per vehicle except for luxury brands, such as 
Jaguar Land Rover ($200 per vehicle) and Ferrari Maserati, Saleen, and 
Spyker (over $600 per vehicle). 
During 2008–2015, the initial years of CAFE and GHG credit trading, 
nearly all firms were accumulating credits, and trades were very infre-
quent (Fig. 2), suggesting that the standards were likely nonbinding or 
that firms were expecting compliance costs to rise (Bialek and Shrader, 
2019). Of the credits earned from 2012 to 2018, three firms (Honda, 
Tesla, and Toyota) accounted for 69%. The same three firms supplied 
94% of the credits sold in 2018 (Fig. 2). 
Because buyers and sellers arrange sales bilaterally, the program 
lacks transparency: the quantity of trades and prices, as well as possible 
side agreements, are not reported. Bialek and Shrader (2019) used 
banking behavior in CAFE to identify expectations of marginal abate-
ment costs. Leard and McConnell (2017), using Tesla’s 2020 Form 10-k 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the sales 
of GHG credits, as well as the settlement between EPA and Hyundai and 
Kia for violating the standard, estimated credit prices at $36–$63/Mg 
(Table 1). Our own estimates using Tesla’s filing data yielded lower 
estimates of $10–$18/Mg for 2017 and 2018 (see the following section). 
2.2. Zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) programs 
The California Air Resources Board first adopted the ZEV require-
ment in 1990. Currently there are nine states that have adopted Cal-
ifornia’s ZEV regulations: Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island and Ver-
mont. Auto manufacturers are required to produce a number of ZEVs 
and plug-in hybrids each year, sufficient to yield credits that correspond 
to a specified percentage of their total California sales. The percentage 
was 4.5% in 2018 and rises to 22% by 2025. Each vehicle receives one to 
four credits, based on its electric driving range. The more electric range a 
vehicle has, the more credits it receives. Auto manufacturers can also 
purchase credits to achieve compliance and bank credits for future use. 
Manufacturers must comply at the end of each compliance period and 
can carry excess credits over to the next period. 
The numerous ZEV credit categories and calculations reflect the 
several kinds of low-emission vehicles available: full battery-electric 
vehicles (BEVs), hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles, plug-in hybrid-electric 
transitional vehicles (TZEVs), partial ZEVs (PZEVs), and advanced 
technology (AT) PZEVs. Prior to 2015, the credit unit was called non-
methane organic gas (NMOG) mass emission (grams per mile), which 
was simplified to ZEV credits after 2015. Fig. 3(a) shows ZEV credit 
trades for 2012–2018. Tesla has generated the most credits by far for 
sale to the other car companies (68%); Toyota is second (10%).5 Toyota 
also bought the most credits (32%), followed by Fiat/Chrysler (16%), 
Honda (13%), and Ford (11%). 
Like other transportation sector TPS programs, the market for the 
ZEV program is closed (i.e., trading is allowed only among regulated 
parties), and credits are transferred directly between two companies or 
through other arrangements, without going through a public market-
place. Credit transactions must be reported, but not credit prices. In 
2016 Tesla sold ZEV credits to Toyota and in 2017 to Toyota, Fiat 
Chrysler, and Subaru, and in 2017 and 2018 Fiat Chrysler sold ZEV 
credits to Honda. Companies also bank a significant amount of credits 
for future use or sales. On August 31, 2018, for example, Toyota held 
about as many ZEV credits in the bank as the total credits sold by Tesla in 
all previous years (Fig. 3(b)). 
ZEV credit sales have provided crucial financial support for Tesla, 
especially in the early years of the program. In general, Tesla vehicles 
earn about four ZEV credits per BEV sold, depending on the model 
(Forbes, 2017). Credit sales constituted 135%6 of Tesla’s gross profit (or 
about $17,000 per vehicle across all models) in 2012; the value 
decreased to 15% (or about $2550 per vehicle across all models) in 2019 
(Fig. 4(b)). Overall, Tesla sold more than $1.05 billion in ZEV credits in 
2009–2019, according to its SEC filings. Each ZEV credit could theo-
retically be worth up to $5000 (the fine for noncompliance), although 
the market value is typically far less. Tesla’s ZEV credit sales are esti-
mated at around $1000–$4200 per ZEV credit except for 2013, when the 
value is estimated to have been close to $7000 per ZEV credit. In 2013, 
Tesla realized approximately $28,000 in ZEV credit value on each sale of 
Model S (priced at $70,000 to $100,000 per vehicle). In addition to ZEV 
credit sales, Tesla also benefited from GHG credit sales (see Section 2.1), 
reported at $315 million in 2018 (Fig. 4(a)). 
2.3. US renewable fuel standard (RFS) 
The national RFS program requires that a certain volume of renew-
able fuels replace or reduce petroleum-based transportation fuel, heat-
ing oil, or jet fuel. The RFS was created in 2005 and expanded under the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which increased the 
volume of renewable fuels to be blended into transportation fuel to 36 
billion gallons by 2022. The four renewable fuel categories under the 
RFS are biomass-based diesel, cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel 
(biodiesel or sugarcane ethanol), and total renewable fuel (nonadvanced 
or conventional biofuel, such as corn ethanol). The maximum levels of 
lifecycle GHG emissions compared with baseline fuels (gasoline or 
diesel) are shown in Fig. 5, where the height of the dots (right side) il-
lustrates the maximum allowable lifecycle carbon intensity of each fuel 
type. 
4 The Trump administration revoked California’s authority to regulated GHG 
emissions in 2019. The validity of the revocation is currently being litigated. 
5 Note that before 2015, Toyota sold only AT PZEV (clean hybrids), essen-
tially discounted ZEV, credits.  
6 This implies that Tesla lost money selling cars, and that its entire gross 
profits came from selling ZEV credits. Gross profit = Revenue – Cost of Reve-
nue, not including operating expenses (including R&D, general administrative, 
etc.). Revenue includes automotive sales, automotive leasing, services and 
other, energy generation and storage segment. Cost of Revenue includes all 
costs associated with generating Revenue. Revenue on the sale of regulatory 
credits is part of the automotive revenue (sales plus leasing). 
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Obligated parties under the RFS program are refiners or importers of 
gasoline or diesel fuel. Compliance is achieved by blending renewable 
fuels into transportation fuel, or by obtaining credits to meet an EPA- 
specified renewable volume obligation. EPA calculates and establishes 
these obligations every year through rulemaking, based on the RFS 
volume requirements and projections of gasoline and diesel production 
for the coming year. The standards are converted into percentages, and 
obligated parties must demonstrate compliance annually. Credits are 
called renewable identification numbers (RINs). Each fuel type is 
assigned a D-code, which identifies the renewable fuel type based on the 
feedstock used, fuel type produced, energy inputs, and GHG reduction 
thresholds, among other requirements. The RFS program’s four renew-
able fuel standards are nested within each other. That is, a fuel with a 
higher GHG percentage reduction can be used to meet the standards for 
a lower GHG percentage reduction, but not vice versa. For example, 
RINs for advanced biofuel (biodiesel or sugarcane ethanol) can be used 
to meet the total renewable fuel standards (corn ethanol). This has 
important implications for the price of RINs, discussed below. 
RFS has created incentives for production of corn ethanol (D6) and 
biodiesel or renewable diesel (D4) (Fig. 5(a)). The D6 RIN price 
increased dramatically, from a few cents in 2012 to more than $1 in 
2013, when in 2013 the gasoline fuel mix hit a “blend wall”—the 
Fig. 1. Summary of CAFE fines, by manufacturer, 1982–2017. 
Sales production volume data are available only for 2004–2018 (US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2020). GHG credit trading started in 2012. Also shown 
are the estimated annual fines in dollars per vehicle by company (2004–2017, from lighter shades in the earlier years to darker shades in the later years). Smaller 
companies are omitted. Source: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) (2020). 
Fig. 2. GHG credits, deficits, purchases, and sales, by 
manufacturer, 2009–2018. 
(a) Total EPA GHG credits (+) and deficits (− ) by 
company, 2009–2018. For example, Fiat Chrysler 
(FCA) accumulated deficits and also purchased credits 
for compliance whereas Toyota accumulated net 
credits and sold some credits. Smaller companies are 
omitted. Source: US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) (2020). (b) Light-duty vehicle GHG emission 
credit sales (<0) and purchases (>0) by manufacturer 
by model year. Manufacturers not shown sold or 
purchased few or no credits during the 2012–2018 
period.   
Table 1 
GHG credit prices ($/Mg), 2012–2018.  
Source 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Leard and McConnell 
(2017) 
$36 $63 $42 – – – – 
Authors’ estimates* $36 $62 $63 $42 – $10 $18  
* Authors’ estimates are based on US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
(2020) and Tesla’s annual financial reports. 
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maximum amount of ethanol (10%, or E10) that can be blended into 
regular gasoline without any risk or fear of causing engine damage in 
conventional vehicles. After the saturation of the E10 pool when the 
blend wall was hit, any additional volume of ethanol can only be 
blended as E85 (85% ethanol). Because the use of E85 is limited to 
flexible-fuel (dual-fuel) vehicles with specialized engines and the sales 
volume of E85 is small, it was difficult to sell or blend more ethanol to 
generate D6 RINS, causing the D6 RIN price to rise in 2013 (Burkholder, 
2015). After 2013, RIN prices of corn ethanol (D6), biomass diesel (D4), 
and advanced biofuel (D5) started to converge because the nesting na-
ture of RFS allows flexible compliance across fuel types, effectively 
lowering the RIN prices. Because cellulosic biofuel never materialized at 
scale, its RIN prices were significantly higher, but they dropped after 
2018, when renewable natural gas (biogas) was included as a compli-
ance option to be counted as cellulosic biofuel. 
2.4. Low-carbon fuel standards (LCFS) 
California’s LCFS, adopted in 2010, is the first major public initiative 
to codify lifecycle concepts into law (Sperling and Yeh, 2009; Yeh et al., 
2016). The same policy was adopted by Oregon in 2016 as the Clean 
Fuels Program. The carbon intensity (CI) of fuels is measured on a life-
cycle basis—that is, emissions from extraction or cultivation of feed-
stock, production, transportation, and use of the fuel are included. The 
legislation calls for at least a 10% reduction in lifecycle GHG emissions 
per unit of energy (gCO2e/MJ)) by 2020 and 20% by 2030. Oil refiners 
can sell low-carbon fuels or buy credits generated by low-carbon fuel 
producers, such as biofuels producers or electric utilities that sell power 
to electric vehicles. 
The alternative fuels for compliance are largely biofuels from corn 
ethanol, biodiesel, and renewable diesel (Fig. 6(a)) because these fuels 
have the lowest compliance costs and are compatible with existing 
vehicle technologies. In contrast with the RFS, however, LCFS allows 
other fuel types, including electricity, and has created strong incentives 
for fuel producers to lower the CI values. As ethanol hit the blend wall in 
2013 (Section 2.3), ethanol’s volume stayed flat (Fig. 6(a)) but 
continued generating more LCFS credits (Fig. 6(b)) because of higher 
production efficiency (e.g., more output per biomass, new technologies 
like corn oil extraction), the use of lower-carbon energy sources as in-
puts in the production processes, and a switch to biomass feedstock with 
lower carbon emissions, such as crop residues, used cooking oil, and 
wastes from food processing. As a result, the CI of ethanol and biodiesel 
across their lifecycle has decreased by 33 and 41%, respectively (Fig. 6 
(b), right vertical axis). Also shown are the volume-weighted average 
lifecycle CI of fuels and total alternative fuels in California (Fig. 6(b), 
right vertical axis). The CI values of ethanol and biodiesel have drasti-
cally decreased over time (shown as arrows) while the CI of other fuels 
has remained mostly unchanged (shown as dots with their 2019Q4 
values). 
The price fluctuations earlier in the program were due in large part to 
policy uncertainty, including legal challenges to the program (Tracy, 
2010). Initially, regulated parties earned more credits than deficits, 
creating a huge surplus of banked credits, because compliance could be 
largely achieved with existing fuel technologies (Fig. 7(a)). As the 
standard became increasingly stringent, regulated parties started 
generating more deficits than credits and in the second half of 2017 
began drawing down the credit bank. Also in that year, expectations 
firmed up regarding the extension of the LCFS through 2030, signaling 
the program’s durability and increasing stringency. These factors 
resulted in higher credit prices after 2017 (Fig. 7(b)). 
2.5. Observations across programs 
Our review of TPS programs indicates that the policies have suc-
ceeded in providing flexibility for compliance: companies have pursued 
different strategies to meet the standards, including selling or purchas-
ing credits and banking. We find substantial amounts of early banking 
for some programs, since companies expected costs to increase as stan-
dards became more stringent, consistent with studies suggesting that 
banking can both smooth out and lower compliance costs for companies 
(Rubin and Leiby, 2013; Bialek and Shrader, 2019). Program trans-
parency varies. In RFS and LCFS, fuel and commodities associations 
publish (unofficial) weekly credit prices that inform their members or 
customers. In the CAFE and ZEV programs, companies are reluctant to 
report prices and regulators are reluctant to require reporting because it 
can reveal commercial information; however, the market is small, major 
players are visible, and in the ZEV program, direct transfer of credits 
between two parties is reported. 
Most of the credit trading programs in the transportation sector are 
not large enough to support public trading platforms. Instead, trading 
takes place bilaterally between companies. Reporting of credit prices 
may or may not be mandatory but reporting the number of credits sold 
or bought and the credit balance at the end of the compliance period is 
always mandatory. Credit prices that are not reported can sometimes be 
calculated from companies’ annual financial reports. Some commodity 
trading companies that specialize in these markets also report credit 
prices as part of the market reports for current and potential clients. 
Table 2 summarizes these TPS programs. 
The observed credit prices of TPS programs reflect the stringency 
level of standards and other factors mentioned above. Credit prices, 
Fig. 3. California ZEV credits, deficits, and credit balances, by manufacturer. 
(a) Total ZEV credits bought (− ) and sold (+) by manufacturer, 2012–2018. 
Credits from 2012 to 2014 were divided by 0.035 to convert grams/mile 
nonmethane organic (NMOG) gas credits to ZEV credits. (b) ZEV credit balances 
as of August 31, 2018. Smaller companies are omitted. Source: California Air 
Resources Board (CARB). (2020b). 
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however, are not directly comparable with a price on carbon imple-
mented through an emissions fee or cap-and-trade, or with each other, 
given that the primary objective of these programs is encouraging 
innovation and system transition. Viewed in terms of cost per ton of 
avoided carbon emissions (Section 4.1), observed credit prices are 
typically higher than in carbon pricing programs globally, but the levels 
are anticipated to be temporary, and technology benefits are expected to 
spill over to transportation markets in other countries. The programs 
simultaneously address other objectives, including energy security, local 
air quality, and (in the case of US ethanol) agricultural support, and they 
may yield savings due to the energy efficiency paradox. Nevertheless, 
given the importance of GHG emissions reductions, below we compare 
and illustrate the difference between TPS and carbon pricing at the 
conceptual level (Section 3), and then look at simulation studies that 
examine the cost and effectiveness of these two approaches individually 
and at the system level (Section 4). 
3. Carbon pricing versus tradable performance standard 
In this section, we briefly compare carbon pricing with a TPS 
formulated as a tradable emissions intensity standard to show how these 
policy approaches relatively affect the product price, technology choice, 
and the incentive to invest in innovation. An important consideration is 
how a change in factor prices, including the introduction of a price (or 
shadow price) on carbon emissions, is passed through to the final price 
of the product. There are many reasons that the cost pass-through could 
be less or greater than the value of the (shadow) price introduced by a 
policy. The economic incidence and statutory incidences do not always 
coincide, what matters is the relative elasticities of supply and demand 
and the degree to which the markets are competitive. In one example, 
Sallee (2011) finds that tax credits for the Toyota Prius were fully passed 
through to consumers. Other studies also found a complete (Knittel 
et al., 2017; Burkhardt, 2019), partial (Lade and Bushnell, 2019) or 
mixed (Erutku, 2019) pass-through of carbon pricing and RIN costs to 
gasoline and biofuels with substantial heterogeneity, “with the retailers’ 
market structure influencing both the speed and level of pass-through” 
(Lade and Bushnell, 2019). 
Costs pass-through depends on: (i) the relative elasticity of supply to 
demand; and (if there is market power) (ii) the degree of market power 
and demand curvature. Since market power would occur at the whole-
sale or retail level and most fuels are blended, demand elasticities would 
be the same across the two policies. The only theoretical reason for 
differential pass-through of TPS versus cap-and-trade (CAT) credits 
would be on the supply elasticity side. This would occur if the supply 
elasticity of renewables is different from the supply elasticity of diesel/ 
gasoline. In this case, the subsidy portion of the TPS credit may be 
passed-through differently. However, there is little reason to believe 
pass-through would be different across the two types of credits. There-
fore incomplete cost pass-through would not change the results as long 
as both a carbon pricing and TPS lead to comparable degrees of pass- 
through to consumers.7 In other words, intensity standard versus car-
bon pricing tradeoff determines the magnitude of the obligation (credit) 
and that industry characteristics (e.g. supply and demand elasticity, 
competitiveness) determine the passthrough of an obligation/credit of 
any particular magnitude. 
Consider two fuels— high-carbon fuel (dirty technology, DT, such as 
gasoline) and low-carbon fuel (clean technology, CT, such as ethanol)— 
Fig. 4. Tesla ZEV and GHG credit sales activity 
and value. 
(a) Tesla’s annual regulatory credit sales, 
2009–2019. Credit sales data for 2019 (blue bar) 
were not reported separately as ZEV vs. GHG 
credit. (b) The annual gross profit from credit 
sales in percentage and in dollars per vehicle 
($/veh) (right vertical axis), 2012–2018. Sources: 
Tesla’s annual SEC Form 10-k filings and investor 
reports; authors’ own estimates. The estimates 
are approximate because the cutoff dates are 
different for sales ($ millions, January 1 to 
December 31) and ZEV credit generation 
(September 1 to August 31 the following year). 
For example, no ZEV credit sales were reported to 
CARB in 2018 (September 1, 2018, to August 31, 
2019) but $103.4 million was reported for 
January 1–December 31, 2018) to the SEC. 
Shifting the overlapping years between these data 
will change the annual estimates but not the 
overall ranges nor trends. (For interpretation of 
the references to color in this figure legend, the 
reader is referred to the web version of this 
article.)   
7 Li et al. (2014) find that the same change in product prices may stimulate 
different changes in consumer behavior based on the source of the price change 
(fuel prices versus gas taxes). 
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Fig. 5. Shares, price trends, and emissions of 
renewable fuels. 
(a) Renewable identification number (RIN, or credit) 
generated by fuel type, 2010–2019, measured as 
equivalence value (EV). The EV of a renewable fuel 
represents the number of gallons that can be claimed 
for compliance purposes for every physical gallon of 
renewable fuel used, and it is generally the ratio of 
the energy content of a gallon of the fuel to a gallon of 
ethanol. (b) RIN prices by fuel type, 2010–2019, and 
maximum allowable lifecycle GHG emissions relative 
to gasoline or diesel for each fuel category. Source: US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (2019).   
Fig. 6. Alternative fuel volumes and California LCFS credits, 
by fuel type. 
(a) “Other” includes hydrogen, renewable naphtha, and pro-
pane. Ethanol, electricity, and other fuel volumes are in gaso-
line gallon equivalent (GGE); natural gas, biomethane, 
biodiesel and renewable diesel are in diesel gallon equivalent 
(DGE). The arrows in (b) suggest 33 and 41% reductions in the 
lifecycle CI of ethanol and biodiesel, respective, throughout the 
program. Sources: California Air Resources Board (CARB). 
(2020a); pers. Commun., J. Witcover, Institute of Trans-
portation Studies, University of California, Davis, May 
232,020.   
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that have respective carbon intensities above and below an emissions 
intensity standard, CDT > CS > CCT, where 
Ci: carbon intensity (gCO2e/MJ) of DT, the standard, and CT (i = DT, 
S,CT). 
EDT: energy content of DT (MJ/liter) 
Pj: carbon tax price and intensity standard credit price ($/gCO2) (j =
T,S). 
∆PjDT: change in price of DT under a tax or standard ($/liter DT). 
Fig. 7. California LCFS credits, deficits, sales, and price trends, 2011–2019. 
(a) Total LCFS credits and deficits reported by year and cumulative credit bank, 2011Q1–2019Q1. Sources: Witcover (2018); California Air Resources Board (CARB). 
(2020a). (b) Volumes of LCFS credit transactions (left axis) and LCFS credit price (right axis), 2013–2019. Source: California Air Resources Board (CARB). (2020a). 
Table 2 
Selected tradable performance standards in US transportation sector.  
Program GHG emissions regulations for vehiclesa Zero-emission vehicle (ZEV)a Renewable fuel standard 
(RFS) 
Low carbon fuel standard 
(LCFS) 
Jurisdiction National California, 9 other states National California, Oregon 
Regulated party Vehicle manufacturers, importers Vehicle manufacturers, importers Fuel producers, importers Fuel producers, 
importers 
Aims To improve vehicle fuel economy, reduce 
GHG intensity 
To increase sales of electric vehicles To increase sales of biofuels To reduce fuels’ GHG 
intensity 
Design Emissions intensity standard (gCO2e/ 
mile) 
Volumetric mandate based on sales 
volumes (number of ZEVs) 
Volumetric mandate based 
on sales volumes 
Emissions intensity 
standard (gCO2e/MJ) 





Megagrams (Mg) or equivalent metric 
tons of CO2e below manufacturer’s 
required standard 
Battery electric and fuel-cell vehicles 
receive 1 to 4 credits, based on driving 
range 
Gallon of gasoline or diesel 
equivalent 
Metric tons of CO2e 
reduction below the 
standard 
Reported or estimated 
credit prices in program’s 
own unitb 




$10–$63/tCO2e $82–$320/tCO2e $20–$52/tCO2e $25–$200/tCO2e 
Credit generation starting 
date 
Early credit 2009–2011; trading in 2012 2009 2010 2011 
Sales volume ($)b $1.7 billion (2012–2015) Tesla sold $1.04 billion in ZEV credits 
(2009–2018), or 68% of all ZEV credits for 
2012–2018 
$76.2 billion based on 
generated RINs 
(2010–2019Q3) 
$8.3 billion (2013–2020 
May)  
a Programs started as technology mandates or standards and incorporated credit trading later. 
b Authors’ own estimates based on original data and reviews of the literature. For more information on credit prices see Sections 2.1–2.4, and Section 4.1 for carbon 
mitigation costs. 
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∆PjCT: change in price of CT under a tax or standard ($/liter DT). 
We use gasoline and ethanol as examples. Because ethanol has less 
energy content than gasoline, we do all the accounting for ethanol in 
liters of gasoline equivalent, which is established by measuring each fuel 
in energy content (megajoules, MJ).8 
3.1. Effect of carbon pricing on fuel prices 
The effect of a carbon price, implemented as a carbon tax or through 
emissions cap-and-trade, is to add a cost component corresponding to 
the carbon emissions of a fuel9 (emissions multiplied by the carbon price 
level) to the fuel price.10 
The emissions from ethanol are typically lower than emissions from 
gasoline, and hence the price of ethanol rises less than the price of 
gasoline. Under a carbon price, (henceforth called tax), the increment to 
the price per liter of gasoline and ethanol depends on the carbon tax, the 
carbon content of the fuel and ρ the pass-through factor: 
∆PDTT = PT×CDT×EDT× ρ  
∆PCTT = PT×CCT×EDT× ρ (1) 
The emission from CT is lower than from DT, and hence the change in 
the price of CT per liter of DT equivalent rises less than the price of DT.11 
The change in the relative prices of the fuels, given by the difference in 
their carbon intensities, provides an incentive for the use of CT over DT. 
We call this the incentive margin (IM) under a carbon tax for producing a 
liter of alternative fuel: 
IMT = PT ×(CDT − CCT )×EDT × ρ (2)  
3.2. Effect of tradable intensity standards on fuel prices 
Tradable intensity standards and taxes have different effects. A tax 
raises the prices of both fuels, but more for gasoline. An intensity stan-
dard will raise the price of dirty fuel just a bit but lower the price of the 
clean fuel. It works by requiring that fuels have an average emissions 
intensity of CS. Producers of fuel with higher emissions intensity need to 
buy credits, and producers of fuel with lower emissions intensity earn 
credits that can be sold. In our example, in effect, credit payments by DT 
serve as a production incentive for CT (and other low-carbon fuels). 
The price changes for DT and CT under the tradable intensity stan-
dard are given by (3). 
∆PDTS = PS×(CDT − CS)×EDT× ρ  
∆PCTS = PS×(CCT − CS)×EDT× ρ (3) 
We calculate the incentive margin for producing a liter of lower 
carbon fuel under a tradable intensity standard as the difference in 
prices for DT and CT: 
IMS = PS ×(CDT − CCT )×EDT × ρ (4) 
Note that IMS and IMT are of the same functional form and would be 
identical for the case that PS = PT. Since ρ applies to both policies equally 
(and assuming that the pass through would be the same for both in-
struments), it is dropped for simplicity in the rest of the paper. It is also 
interesting that CS is absent in Eq. (4); that is, the incentive margin of the 
tradable intensity standard IMS is only indirectly related to the level of 
standard through the credit prices. The more stringent the intensity 
standard, the higher the credit price, and therefore the higher the 
incentive margin. 
We illustrate in Fig. 8 that under a carbon tax, both high-carbon fuel 
(dirty technology, DT, such as gasoline) and low-carbon fuel (clean 
technology, CT, such as ethanol) are penalized by higher prices, whereas 
under the tradable intensity standard, the low-carbon fuel receives a 
“reward” instead. Importantly, when the carbon tax price (PT) and in-
tensity standard credit price (PS) are equal, PS = PT, the changes in fuel 
prices (both positive and negative) are much smaller under an intensity 
standard, since the price change is only the credit price multiplied by the 
difference between the standard, CS, and the carbon intensity of the fuel, 
(CDT – CS and CCT – CS), whereas the price change under a carbon tax is 
the credit price multiplied by the full carbon intensity of the fuel or 
technology (CDT and CCT). Subsequently, the average price of both fuels 
is lower under an intensity standard than with revenue-raising carbon 
taxation because payments are made and received within the sector, i.e., 
no revenue leaves the sector to go to government (Rajagopal et al., 
2011). This is good news for motorists (and may explain why this in-
strument is often favored by policymakers). However, it also means that 
the incentive to economize on miles driven will be weaker—this weak 
output effect is a source of inefficiency in a TPS system relative to a tax. 
Fig. 8. Price change of dirty and clean technology under carbon tax and 
tradable intensity standard. 
Price change of two products (a dirty technology, DT, and a clean technology, 
CT, with equivalent energy content) under a carbon price (T) or credit price 
under an intensity standard (S), and the incentive margins of a carbon tax (IMT) 
vs. a performance standard (IMS) for an equivalent carbon and standard price 
level, PT = PS = P. A negative value means a technology receives subsidies 
under the program, and a positive value means the program increases the price 
of a technology. For reference, the carbon price in California was around $17/ 
tCO2e and LCFS credit price was around $200/tCO2e in the first half of 2020, 
translating to about equal level of IM. Though the figures are intended to be 
illustrative (therefore the vertical axes are not labeled), the figures are scaled 
realistically, using realistic assumptions of gasoline CDT = 100 gCO2e, ethanol 
CCT = 60 gCO2e with the standard set at 90 gCO2e (10% below gasoline CI). 
8 The energy content of ethanol is about two-thirds that of gasoline, 24 MJ/l 
versus 34 MJ/l.  
9 We assume the carbon price is applied over the full lifecycle, though in real 
policy applications this is not always the case. In contrast, the LCFS accounts for 
emissions across the entire lifecycle for each fuel. These two approaches reflect 
the system boundaries of the two policies and have significant implications in 
terms of leakage. See DeCicco (2012) for a discussion of the trade-offs.  
10 Here we have assumed the conventional structure of a tax: the user pays a 
tax on each unit of emissions. This need not be the case. A different outcome 
would result if the policymaker allowed a certain amount of pollution for free 
and charged only for the excess pollution (Pezzey and Jotzo, 2013). This pos-
sibility is rarely (if ever) used, but it would make the tax similar in some re-
spects to a tradable intensity standard. The same result as for a tax would be 
achieved in a carbon trading scheme where allowances were distributed using 
output-based allocation of emissions allowances (Fischer, 2019), a practice that 
is observed for a portion of the market in the EU, California, and Quebec trading 
programs.  
11 It is often the case, however, that biofuels (e.g. ethanol) are treated as 
“carbon neutral” under cap-and-trade programs and therefore do not pay a 
carbon price. 
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As we discuss in Section 4, both a carbon price (through cap and 
trade) and tradable emissions intensity standards including the LCFS 
and ZEV programs are implemented simultaneously in California. The 
LCFS credit price is about ten times greater than the carbon price (PS =
10×PT), and generates an incentive to switch from dirty to clean fuel 
that is about 10 times greater. However, the change in the product price 
viewed by consumers attributable to each program is about equal 
(around 20 cents per gallon). The effects of the two policies on the 
incentive to produce alternative fuels and on the change in fuel prices 
are roughly additive. 
We make two important observations. First, the incentive to produce 
alternative fuel instead of gasoline expressed as IM (included implicitly 
in a carbon tax program or explicitly in a performance standard pro-
gram) is a function solely of the carbon tax or credit price across both 
programs. n California, we observe that CAT has lower values per ton 
carbon, and therefore weaker incentives for technology switching, than 
TPS programs. 
Second, because emissions pricing puts an equal value on emissions 
reductions through changes in technology or through reduced con-
sumption of goods that embed emissions, it is equivalent to a coupled 
performance standard program and consumption tax, where the credit 
and tax prices have a fixed relationship with each another. Because a 
performance standard focuses on producers and a consumption tax af-
fects consumers, policymakers wishing to increase the effect of tech-
nology switching by producers could consider decoupling these two 
aspects of a carbon tax. Although any deviation away from a pure carbon 
tax would be less efficient economically, a decoupling may foster greater 
technology innovation by producers without transmitting an equivalent 
change in product prices to consumers. In the industrial sector context, 
this decoupling may help maintain industry’s overall market share amid 
international competition during a transition until technical, political, 
and societal factors allow for greater levels of a consumption tax (Pollitt 
et al., 2020). As we discussed above, incomplete costs passthrough as a 
result of supply and demand elasticity and industry competitiveness may 
change the magnitude of the obligation (credit) to a similar degree. 
4. Effects on GHG emissions reductions 
As emphasized previously, the most important objective of TPS is not 
GHG emissions reductions but other societal benefits—energy transi-
tion, energy efficiency, clean air, energy security, agricultural jobs—that 
lower the cost of clean(er) technology over time. The cost estimates also 
differ, depending on a static versus dynamic view of the program and the 
system-level interactions that are taken into account. For example, the 
GHG reduction from one ZEV credit depends on what vehicle the 
alternative vehicle replaces, the system-level effects of the program such 
as emission leakages and rebound, and the effects of complementary or 
overlapping policies (Mansur et al., 2016). In this section, we evaluate 
the cost-effectiveness of individual TPS programs in terms of the 
empirically observed carbon abatement cost ($/ton CO2e abated) (Sec-
tion 4.1). We review studies that examine the effects of the programs in 
isolation (Section 4.2), the interactions of TPS programs (Section 4.3), 
and the effects of a TPS program within a cap-and-trade program (Sec-
tion 4.3). 
4.1. Carbon mitigation costs 
Given the various policy targets, the units of TPS credits vary (as 
summarized in Table 2 and discussed in detail in Section 3). For 
example, GHG regulations for vehicles have a credit price of $10–63/ 
MgCO2e,12 the LCFS credit price is around $200 per credit (tCO2e), RFS 
RIN credits range from $0.02 to $2.24 per RIN (equivalent value of 
biofuel gallon), and ZEV credits range from $1000 to $7000 per credit 
(Table 1). The GHG regulations for vehicles credit price of $63/Mg 
($63/tCO2e) and the LCFS credit price of $200/tCO2e can both be taken 
directly as the marginal mitigation cost of GHG abatement. At $1000– 
$7000 per ZEV credit, the marginal mitigation cost of ZEV is $82–$560/ 
tCO2e.13 Simulation studies suggest RFS2 compliance costs are likely to 
range between $20–$52/tCO2e (Chen et al., 2014; Johansson et al., 
2020). These illustrative estimates are consistent with the static cost 
estimates reviewed in Gillingham and Stock (2018). 
4.2. Effects of TPS programs in isolation 
Several studies find that CAFE has altered manufacturers’ vehicle 
offerings and consumers’ purchase decisions (Greene, 1998; Michalek 
et al., 2005; Fischer, 2010). Various studies identify an emissions 
rebound from increased consumption because efficiency improvements 
lower the cost of travel (Ross Morrow et al., 2010), though the size of 
rebound is debated in the literature (Small and Van Dender, 2007; 
Hymel et al., 2010; Greene, 2012; Hymel and Small, 2015; Dimi-
tropoulos et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the fuel economy standards’ 
reduction in GHG emissions has been substantial. Greene et al. (2020) 
estimated that efficiency improvements to US light-duty vehicles 
reduced GHG emissions by 17 billion metric tons; the standards were 
identified as responsible for more than 80% of the improvements, and 
fuel prices changes, less than 20% (partly because of low fuel prices in 
the United States). However, the new footprint-based vehicle GHG 
standard could trigger a rebound effect stemming from the distorted 
incentives toward larger vehicles for manufacturers and consumers (Ito 
and Sallee, 2017). 
Similarly, studies find that the ZEV program has altered manufac-
turers’ ZEV production (Collantes and Sperling, 2008; Wesseling et al., 
2014, 2015; Jenn et al., 2019). Using data on patents, sales, and political 
activity, studies find that manufacturers also chose political strategies 
that evolved over time from value maintenance (minimize research and 
development, oppose the policy) to value creation (invest heavily in 
research and development to occupy the new market, proactively 
attempt to influence the policy) (Wesseling et al., 2014, 2015). 
Many studies have looked at the effects of RFS (de Gorter and Just, 
2010; Schnepf and Yacobucci, 2013; National Research Council (NRC), 
2011; Farzad and Tyner, 2014) and LCFS (Yeh et al., 2009; Holland 
et al., 2009; Yeh and Sperling, 2010; Huang et al., 2013). The policies 
incentivized large amounts of grain-based biofuels from corn and soy-
bean, but both fell short of incentivizing very low carbon biofuels, such 
as biofuels from cellulosic biomass or advanced technologies like “drop- 
in” biofuels. However, consistent with the LCFS incentives, we observe 
under the LCFS compliance pathways an evolution toward reducing the 
lifecycle emissions of biofuels and increasing the contribution from 
nonbio-based alternative fuels (Fig. 6). The more complicated questions 
are the net GHG emissions reductions and the interactions of the two 
policies. Two controversies surround the effects GHG reductions: (1) 
increased fuel consumption and incomplete petroleum displacement due 
to the (global) fuel market rebound effect (Rajagopal et al., 2011; Hill 
et al., 2016), and (2) indirect land-use change due to leakage when 
increased demand for crop-based biofuels leads to cropland expansion 
and forest clearance that increase GHG emissions (Tilman et al., 2009; 
National Research Council (NRC), 2011). 
4.3. Interactive effects: complementary, overlapping, or sequencing? 
The success of performance standards critically depends on their 
interaction with other policy packages. This interaction is complemen-
tary in addressing long-term, large-scale energy transitions, in several 
12 1 Mg CO2e = 1 metric ton (t) CO2e. 
13 Assumptions: EV runs 1.6 km/MJ and an average gasoline car runs 0.5 km/ 
MJ; electricity CI = 200 gCO2e/MJ (California grid); a vehicle is driven 19,200 
km annually for 15 years. 
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ways. For instance, a ZEV policy does not stand on its own in promoting 
clean transportation technology: other policies provide subsidies 
directly to consumers (Sen et al., 2017; Münzel et al., 2019), subsidize 
investment in charging stations (Peterson and Michalek, 2013) and 
hydrogen refueling stations for electric vehicles (Ogden, 1999), 
encourage changes to laws and regulations on station design and siting 
(among other institutional changes), inform potential vehicle purchasers 
and reduce risk aversion to new technologies, subsidize R&D, and seek 
to lower electricity emissions. Additionally, the more successful ZEV and 
RFS are, the easier it is to achieve the LCFS because the adoption of low- 
carbon vehicles and fuels expands and enhances the compliance options. 
All these programs promote the adoption of clean vehicles and fuels, but 
LCFS provides additional incentives to lower the emissions intensity of 
alternative fuels. 
However, a combination of policies can also lead to undesirable 
consequences. For example, Jenn et al. (2019) simulate the interactive 
effect of CAFE and ZEV policies and find that the combined policies 
produce higher GHG emissions than either policy alone. This is because 
ZEV sales allow for the greater sale of less fuel efficient gasoline and 
diesel vehicles in the presence of a binding CAFE standard. Comple-
mentarity requires, preferably, automatic program adjustments and re-
views of policy targets given interactions with other policies. 
4.4. TPS programs combined with carbon pricing 
In California, cap-and-trade (CAT) is implemented alongside other 
regulations and policies to reduce overall emissions (Sperling and 
Nichols, 2012). California’s CAT Phase I compliance period (effective 
January 1, 2013) placed a cap on GHG emissions associated with elec-
tricity consumption (for electricity both generated in the state and im-
ported) and large industrial sources in the state, including refineries. 
Starting January 1, 2015, the CAT policy was expanded to include GHG 
emissions from on-road transportation fuels, covering gasoline, diesel, 
and natural gas but exempting carbon emissions from biofuels. The CAT 
and the TPS programs are designed to address separate challenges in 
achieving the state’s comprehensive climate goal. One challenge is the 
carbon price is insufficiently high to achieve the kind of rapid techno-
logical innovation necessary for energy transformation and deep GHG 
emissions reductions in an ambitious timeline. TPS programs are 
partially intended to remedy this challenge. 
TPS and carbon pricing policies could also have other interactions in 
terms of compliance and effects on both regulated parties and con-
sumers. California’s regulated parties have several compliance obliga-
tions (Table 1) in addition to CAT. For vehicle manufacturers and 
importers, regulations for GHG emissions from passenger cars and trucks 
and ZEV are additive (“stackable”), and meeting the ZEV program will 
help with meeting the regulations for GHG emissions, but not vice versa 
(Sen et al., 2017). As shown in Fig. 4, Tesla profited from selling regu-
latory credits, including both ZEV credits and GHG credits. Similarly, for 
fuel producers and importers, meeting the RFS will help with meeting 
the LCFS targets. Renewable fuel producers and providers will receive 
credits from both RFS and LCFS, and compliance will reduce the obli-
gations under the CAT if the obligated party is a fossil fuel provider. 
As an example, Fig. 9 uses realistic assumptions in California to 
illustrate the credit values per gallon for two representative fuel types, 
gasoline and very low carbon biofuel, and the additive effects of LCFS, 
CAT, and RFS (the example works similarly for diesel fuel and its sub-
stitutes). The incentive margin of the fuel market is the sum of the 
penalties on fossil fuels plus incentives for biofuel. The additive effect 
remains large, given the rising penalties on gasoline (and diesel) despite 
the shrinking values of the incentives for biofuel over time. The com-
bined effect is substantially greater than the incentive margin provided 
by carbon pricing from the CAT alone. For example, in 2020 biofuel 
received a net subsidy of $3.0/GGE, and gasoline incurred a penalty of 
$0.37 per gallon. Under the three programs, the net cost per average 
gallon of gasoline (E10) bought by consumers was a net subsidy of $0.1 
per gallon in 2020. In 2030 the subsidy to biofuel of the same carbon 
intensity falls to $2.7/GGE (assuming the same credit price) and the 
penalty on gasoline increases to $0.93 per gallon, for a net cost of $0.2 
per gallon of blended gasoline to consumers. 
Many observers argue for complementary CAT (or carbon pricing 
generally) and regulatory policies in the presence of imperfect markets 
(Bird et al., 2011) or learning spillovers (Fischer and Preonas, 2012; 
Lehmann, 2013). For example, energy-efficient technologies, a critical 
component of the transition to sustainable energy (GEA, 2012), are often 
hindered by the energy efficiency paradox, a behavioral issue. Whether 
consumers undervalue the future savings from energy efficiency im-
provements (termed “internalities” by Allcott et al., 2014) and if so, to 
what extent, is a subject of ongoing debate and research (Gillingham and 
Palmer, 2014; Gerarden et al., 2015). If behavioral issues are prevalent, 
then pricing inefficiency through a combination of energy efficiency 
incentives, along with a direct tax or shadow price induced by an 
equivalent TPS, may be a necessary component of an economically 
efficient policy solution (Allcott et al., 2014; Heutel, 2015). 
The variation in marginal costs and other incentives across these 
policies, however, creates inefficiency and, inevitably, forgone oppor-
tunities for emissions reductions that could be remedied through carbon 
pricing. This inefficiency may be necessary due to the high political cost 
of trying to implement carbon prices at levels recommended by eco-
nomic theory, and a combination of modest carbon prices with perfor-
mance standards will cost less than a standard-only policy that reduces 
the same amount of emissions (Dimanchev and Knittel, 2020). In the 
Fig. 9. Additive effects of policies in California’s fuel market, 
2017–2030. 
The effects on gasoline are shown in black (CAT) and gray 
(LCFS), and the effects on low-carbon biofuels are shown in 
dark green (RFS) and light green (LCFS). Positive values imply 
that a product receives credits, whereas negative values imply 
that a product incurs penalties. We use the realistic assump-
tions of credit prices described in Section 4: LCFS $200/credit, 
CAT carbon price from $15/tCO2e in 2017 to $50/tCO2e in 
2030, cellulosic biofuels RIN historical values (2017–2020) 
and $1.8/gal after 2020. The carbon intensity of biofuel = 40 
gCO2e/MJ. GGE means gasoline gallon equivalent. Gasoline 
has on average 119.5 MJ/gal, and ethanol = 81.5 MJ/gal. (For 
interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, 
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)   
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short run, technology forcing programs can have the effect of lowering 
the effectiveness of carbon pricing under CAT programs through the 
“waterbed effect” by lowering the demand for allowances, thereby 
lowering their market price and the induced incentive for innovation in 
the carbon market (Abrell, 2011; Tsao et al., 2011; Fischer and Preonas, 
2012; Nelson et al., 2015). In the California CAT program, the minimum 
auction price provides an effective price floor that converts reduced 
demand for allowances into a reduced supply of allowances and reduced 
emissions. In the long run, innovation-driven policies in the trans-
portation sector can be viewed as a policy sequence that provides an on- 
ramp to greater stringency and efficiency through expanded carbon 
pricing (Meckling et al., 2017; Pahle et al., 2018). 
5. Conclusions 
Tradable performance standards are technology requirements or 
emissions intensity standards that allow the trading of compliance 
credits across companies. Unlike pollution pricing, they do not fully 
internalize the costs of emissions and thus they raise the total cost of 
emissions reductions compared with pollution pricing. However, they 
provide incentives for upstream innovation and technology trans-
formation that are greater per dollar change in product prices than 
carbon pricing and are generally additive to the effects of carbon pricing. 
That is, the policies can be combined without sacrificing the efficiency 
properties achieved by pricing. 
TPS policies have special appeal in the context of achieving deep 
decarbonization because of the crucial role of innovation. Reducing 
GHG emissions enough to limit global warming to 1.5◦ or 2.0 ◦C requires 
a global transition from fossil energy. This transition could in principle 
be achieved with carbon pricing, but the complexity, inherent uncer-
tainty, and systemic nature of the climate challenge would necessitate 
unrealistically high carbon prices (e.g., Rosenbloom et al., 2020). 
Comprehensive strategies addressing institutional change, network ef-
fects, tipping points, and behavioral issues also appear unreachable 
except with very high carbon prices. The transition will take decades, so 
it requires policies that will enjoy sustained public support. TPS policies 
thus present an attractive alternative, particularly in jurisdictions with 
strong resistance to fuel taxes (e.g., Heutel, 2020). Moreover, the carbon 
pricing and TPS strategies are not mutually incompatible. 
Two observations provide guidance for policy: 
First, the incentive to innovate, which we describe as the incentive 
margin—whether included implicitly in a carbon tax program or 
explicitly as a cross-subsidy among technologies in a TPS program—is a 
function solely of the carbon and credit prices across both policies. We 
observe empirically that carbon pricing programs tend to have lower 
prices, and therefore weaker incentives for technology switching, than 
existing TPS programs. Even with explicitly high fuel taxes in Europe 
and Japan, the incentives for technology change are still likely to be 
insufficient to achieve climate policy goals for the transportation sector. 
In California, where carbon pricing may have approximately the same 
effect on consumer prices as a TPS, the incentive margin for technology 
innovation under the TPS is 10-fold greater. 
Second, when combined with a carbon tax, TPS both achieves a high 
cross-subsidy between technologies to incentivize innovation and pro-
vides moderate output effects. TPS policies are intended to function as 
part of a comprehensive strategy to address long-term, large-scale en-
ergy transitions. Their success therefore critically depends on the other, 
companion policies, including carbon pricing, and care must be taken to 
ensure that overlapping policies work as intended without creating 
unintended consequences. With these conditions firmly in place, TPS 
policies will be, and are now, an important contributor to global 
decarbonization. 
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